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ADmIRALTY-STATE WORKMEN'S ComPEmsATIoN LAWS MAY EXCLUDE ADMm-
ALTY FROM JUIuSDICION.-An employer had taken out the necessary insurance to
comply with the Workmen's Compensation Law of New York, under which his
liability in that event was confined to the compensation fixed by that statute to
the exclusion of any general liability arising from his duty as master to his
servants. An employee being injured on shipboard brought a libel in rem in
the Admiralty Court against the vessel upon which he was injured. Held, that
under the United States Judicial Code, as recently amended (which amend-
ments are constitutional), the employer was equally absolved from any liability
arising under the maritime law. The Steamlighter Howell (1gig, S. D. N. Y.)
61 N. Y. L. J. 454.
The course of decision as to the status of compensation laws in Admiralty has
previously been noted in these pages. The New York Workmen's Compensation
Law has been held to conflict with the Federal Constitution. Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U. S. "205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524; (1917) 27 YALE LAW
JoURNAL, 255. Congress thereupon amended that provision of the Judicial Code
which saved to all suitors from the grant'of admiralty jurisdiction the right of
a common-law remedy where the common law was competent to give it, by
adding the phrase "and to claimants the rights and remedies under the Work-
men's Compensation Law of any State." See ibid. 924. This amendment was
held valid and retroactive in Cimmino v. Clark (I918, App. Div.) 172 N. Y.
Supp. 478; (Xgig) 28 YALE_ LAW JotRxni., 281. The present case holds that
the amendment is valid even if interpreted to act prospectively. The decision is
the logical corollary to the holding that the amendment is valid. It is possible,
however, that the United States Supreme Court may not agree with the inter-
pretation here put upon the Jensen decision, namely, that Congress has the power
to determine the extent of the grant of admiralty jurisdiction in the Federal
Constitution. See (I918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 924, 926.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-ATTR1EY FOR DEFENDENT-FORMER REPRESENTATION
OF PLAINTIFF.In a suit for divorce the petitioner miade application to compel
the defendant's solicitor to withdraw from the case because he had been the
petitioner's solicitor in a similar suit between the same parties which was dis-
missed by the court in 1912. The petitioner's alleged present cause for divorce
was adultery committed in 1917, while the cross-petition stated that the petitioner
had deserted the defendant for more than two years past. Held, that the
application be denied. Wilbur v. Wilbur (i918, N. J. Ch.) io5 At. 664.
The decision was grounded on the fact that the matters pleaded in the former
suit were res adjudicata and could not be projected into the present case because
both petition and cross-petition set up causes of action which arose subsequent
to the termination of the relation of attorney and client between the petitioner
and the solicitor for the present defendant. See The Duties of Attorney, by
Hon. Edwin B. Gager (I911) 21 Y= LAW JOURNAL, 72.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-BI.LBOARD REsTRICTIONS-OBLIGATION OF CoNTRACTS.-
The defendant city enacted an ordinance which limited the area of a billboard
to four hundred square feet and the height above ground to fourteen feet. It
required a space of four feet between a billboard and the ground and forbade
the construction nearer than six feet to a building, or two feet to another bill-
board, or fifteen feet to the street line. The plaintiff sued to restrain the
enforcement of this ordinance, claiming that it was in violation of the Fourteenth
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Amendment; that the plaintiff's billboards were built upon private ground and
were free from damages resulting from fire and wind; that contracts entered
into before the enactment of this ordinance tilaced duties upon the plaintiff to
maintain for three years advertisements of a standard size which was larger
than the ordinance allowed. Held, that the ordinance must be upheld. St. Louis
Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis (1919) 39 Sup. Ct. 274.
The instant decision reinforces the earlier cases in asserting that billboards
may be placed in a class by themselves and prohibited in residential districts,
or be discouraged by a high tax, or prohibited altogether; that such legislation
will not be declared invalid because of an incidental effect upon duties resulting
from contracts or because some of the objectionable features may have been
eliminated or because of trifling requirements which are not aimed solely to
satisfy basic wants. Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago (1917) 242 U. S. 526, 37
Sup. Ct. 19o, discussed in (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 42o. In support of the
constitutionality of statutes forbidding advertising signs on property, see (1914)
24 YALE LAW JoURNAL, I.
CONsTIUrIoNAL LAw-DUE. PROCESs-PROHiBrioRY LiQuoR STAT=rs.-The
defendant was convicted for having liquor in his possession in violation of a
prohibitory liquor statute. The statute, by its terms, did not become effective
until several months after its approval, and it was in this interim that the
defendant acquired his stock of liquor. It was contended that if the statute was
construed to apply to liquor so acquired, it was void under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Held, that such construction did not make the statute invalid.
Barbour v. State of Georgia (1919) 39 Sup. Ct. 316.
It has been settled that the exercise of a State's police power cannot be
obstructed by a person's entering into a contract after the enactment of the
statute and with full notice of the time it is to become effective. Diamond
Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co. (19o2) 187 U. S. 611, 23 Sup. Ct. 2o6. The
Court refused to pass on the more doubtful question as to the constitutionality
of the statute if applied to liquor acquired before its enactment The similar
question as to whether the prohibition of sale may be constitutionally applied
to liquor acquired previous to the approval of the statute has also been raised
by the United States Supreme Court but iot settled. Bartemeyer v. Iowa
(1874) 18 Wall. 129, 21 L. ed. 929; Beer Company v. Massachusetts (1877) 97
U. S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989.
CONsTIuTIoNAL LAW-REED AmENDmENT-NOT PROHinITIV oF TRANsPoRTA-
TION OF LIQUOR THROUGH A STAr.-The defendant was indicted for having
transported liquor into Virginia in violation of the Reed amendment. The facts
showed that the defendant was travelling on a through ticket from Maryland
to North Carolina, and was arrested while the train was temporarily stopped in
Virginia, although he had no intention of leaving the train until it arrived in
North Carolina. Held, that the motion to quash was properly granted. United
States v. Gudger (1919) 39 Sup. Ct. 323.
This decision interprets the prohibition against transporting liquor in inter-
state commerce "into any State or Territory the laws of which State or Territory
prohibit the manufacture" as not to include the movement in interstate commerce
through such a state to another. Says Chief Justice White: "The word 'into,'
as used in the statute, refers to the state of destination, and not to the means by
which that end is reached, the movement through one State as a mere incident
of transportation to the State into which it is shipped." For a similar ruling
in regard to the interpretation of a state statute of similar import, see Stare v.
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Frazee (1918, W. Va.) 97 S. E. 6o4. For discussion of the Reed Amendment
as a valid regulation of interstate commerce, see (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
501.
CONTRACTS-CONSTRUCTION--"TRooPs OF THE UNITED STATE."-The plaintiff
railroad entered into an agreement with the Federal Government to transport
"troops of the United States" at rates equal to fifty per cent of those which
individuals were charged. The Auditor of the War Department allowed only
half-fare for the transportation of the following classes of persons, claiming
they were "troops of the United States" within the agreement: discharged
soldiers on the way home; rejected applicants for enlistment being returned
to points of recruitment; discharged military prisoners; accepted applicants for
enlistment on the way to recruiting depots for final examination and enlistment;
retired soldiers on the way home after retirement; and soldiers on furlough
returning to their proper stations. All these men travelled individually. The
railroad sued to recover the difference between the amount paid and the full
rate for each individual carried. Held, that the plaintiff could recover, as
"troops" referred to soldiers collectively, and "transportation of troops" did
not include any of these classes. United States v. Union Pacific R. R. (Igig)
39 Sup. Ct. 294.
The decision greatly limits the potential duties placed upon the railroads by
these agreements. But the case does not determine the status of individual
soldiers en route from camp to camp on government business, nor how large a
number is required to constitute "troops" within the meaning of such agree-
ments.
CONTRACTS - ILLEGAiTY - AGREEMENT TO OBTAIN CONTRACT FROM GOVERN-
MENT.-The defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff a commission on any contract
for army uniforms which the latter might procure for the defendant from the
United States Government. The plaintiff procured such a contract, but the
defendant refused to pay the commission. Held, that the plaintiff's claim was
against public policy and void. Beck v. Bauman (1919, Sup. Ct) 173 N. Y.
Supp. 772.
Such contracts are generally enforcible when the New York State government
is involved. Dunham v. Hastings (19o7) 189 N. Y. 5oo, 8I N. E. 1163. But
not, of course, when it is proved that the parties intended to resort improperly
to public officials. Chard v. Ryan-Parker Construction Co. (1918) 182 App.
Div. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 622. But where the United States Government is
involved, the state courts will follow the rule of the federal courts. For further
discussion see (1919) 28 YAL.E LAw JOURNAL, 502.
CONTACTS-IMPOSSILIn Y OF PERFORMANCE-WAR ORDER.-The defendant con-
tracted to sell TNT to the plaintiff. A few days later the United States Govern-
ment, induced by the defendant's agents, purchased the TNT at an increased
price, and issued an order stating that the material was "taken" under power
granted by the National Defense Act. The plaintiff sued for breach of con-
tract, alleging that the defendant's sale to the United States was voluntary.
The defendant claimed to be relieved from his contractual duties because of
Vis major. Held, that there could be no recovery, as the material was taken
under "power" of the Act. Nitro Powder Co. v. Agency of Canadian Car and
Foundry Co. (1919, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 6o N. Y. L. J. 213 (March 29, I919).
The court ruled that the statement in the order that it was taken under the
"power" of the Act was conclusive, regardless of the motives of the defendant
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in initiating the sale or of the manner in which the terms of the sale had been
fixed. For discussion of the effect on contracts of war orders or other acts of
state; see, COMMENTS (1919) 28 YALE LAW JouRNAr, 399; also (1918) :27 ibid.
953; (g99) 28 ibid. 615.
CORPOuTIONS-INTERLOCKING OrrIcERs-CoNTRAcTs.-The plaintiff, a corpora-
tion, sued to compel specific performance of a contract. The defendant, also a
corporation, answered that the contract was made under the dominating influence
of a common director and that its terms were unfair and oppressive. The facts
showed that the contract was engineered by the common director but that he
refrained from voting at the meeting of defendant which ratified the contract;
the contract was to remain in force for a number of years, but at the end of
two years the defendant, having found it unfair, refused to continue performing.
Held, that the contract was voidable at the option of the defendant. Globe
Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co. (1918, N. Y.) 121 N. E. 378.
This decision rests in the sound principle that directors like trustees, where
they have conflicting interests, are under a strict duty to act honestly and fairly
in their dealings. Marshall, Corporations, sec. 377. The New York rule goes
further and makes the contract voidable in such cases as the instant one, at the
option of the corporation, even though there is no fraud. Clark, Corporations,
sec. 202.
INjUNcTIoNS--RESTRAINING FORMER EMPLOYEE FROM SOLICITING BusiNEss.
The plaintiff employed the defendant to manage an insurance agency. After
fifteen months the defendant resigned and started an agency for himself. He
secured a contract with a company which the plaintiff represented, and the
plaintiff brought a bill in equity to restrain the defendanf from acting as agent
for this company, and from soliciting business from the plaintiff's customers.
Held, that the injunction should not be granted. S. W. Scott & Co. v.
Samuel W. Scott (i919, App. Div.) x74 N. Y. Supp. 583.
Where there is no contract to the contrary, a former employee is privileged,
as against his former employer, to engage in a similar business. Unless there
is fraud or deceit practiced, solicitation of a former employer's customers does
not constitute unfair competition. For further discussion see COMMENTS (1915)
25 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 499.
MANDAMUS-CNIL SERVICE EMPLOYEE-LACHEs.-The relator, who as superin-
tendent of the Crater Natural Park was in the classified civil service of the
Government, was removed from office on June 28, 1913, by order of the defend-
ant, Secretary of the Interior, and forcibly ejected from the government build-
ing. On April 30, 1915, he filed a petition in mandamus to be restored. Held,
that whatever right the petitioner had, had been forfeited by laches. Arant v.
Lane (1919) 39 Sup. Ct. 293.
It seems that an employee in the classified civil service is entitled to com-
pensation during a period of wrongful suspension. United States v. Wicker-
sham (i9o5) 2oI U. S. 390, 26 Sup. Ct. 469. But by allowing twenty months to
pass without instituting the petition in the instant case the petitioner has clearly
permitted such a change of circumstances as justifies invoking the doctrine of
laches. As to the applicability of the doctrine of laches to mandamus proceed-
ings, see 9 Ann. Cas. 846, note.
OFFIcEs-OFFICE NOT "PROPERTY"--RESTRAINING INTERFERENCE WITH OFFICE.-
The plaintiff filed a bill in equity to restrain the defendants, members of a board
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of school trustees, from interfering with him in assuming his duties as a member
of the board, to which he had been elected. Held, that a demurrer to the bill
was properly sustained. Haupt v. Schmidt (Ig9g, Ind.) 122 N. E. 343.
The plaintiff's political "privilege" to participate in the councils of the board
was not disputed; but his choice of remedy was unfortunate. The decision by
the court was grounded on the elementary principles that a public office is not
"property," and that the right to hold an office and perform the duties thereof
is not a "property" right, but a political right of which equity takes no
cognizance. For an apposite diicussion on the tendency to confuse and blend
legal and non-legal conceptions, in which the concept "property" is particularly
examined, see Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1913) 23 YALE LAw
JoURN., 16, 21-25.
Wonxn mE's COMPENSATION-INJUr-r ARiSING OUT OF THE EmPLOYMENT-
AssAILT By DIschAaRGED Em P EOvF.-The decedent was head waiter at a hotel
and his duties embraced the discharge of waiters in the interest of his employer.
He discharged a waiter for disobedience of orders. Later the discharged
employee, angry and inflamed with liquor, shot and killed him. Held, that the
injury arose "out of" the employment. Cranney's Case (1919, Mass.) 122
N. E. 266.
The risk of being assaulted by one aggrieved over the exercise of authority
seems clearly incidental to the duty of exercising authority. Such injuries as
received in the principal case have, therefore, been held compensable. Trim
School Bd. v. Kelly [1914] A. C. 667 (school teacher assaulted by students);
Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury (1915) i7o Cal. 686, i5i Pac. 398 (fore-
man in charge of section gang assaulted by laborer); Polar Ice & Fuel Co. v.
Mulray (x918, Ind. App.) i1g N. E. 149 (bookkeeper employed to check up and
collect for shortage assaulted by driver). In such case the character of the
assaulting employee, whether peaceable or quarrelsome, is immaterial. County
of San Bernardino v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1917) 35 Cal. App. 33, 169 Pac. 255.
As to the situation where one not in authority is. assaulted by a fellow employee,
see (igi8) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 965.
